Professor John Wasowitz
Christopher S. Lee
1) Equal Protection
2) Due Process
3) Exclusionary Rule = 4th + 14th Amendments
4) Molly v. Hogan (1964) – 5th Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination
5) Benton v. Maryland (1969)
a. Prohibition against Double Jeopardy
b. Test – Are they all the same elements?
c. Sentencing – Only following conviction
6) Gideon v. Wainright (1963) – Gideon’s Trumpet
a. 6th Amendment right to speedy trial
b. Speed – Time limits set by statute
f. Compulsory Process/Subpoenas
7) Rochin v. California (1952)
a. D swallows drug evidence
b. Police pump stomach
8) Schmarker v. California (1956)
a. SC permits blood test during DUI
b. Requires Refusal to take Blood Test + DWI
9) Linkletter v. Lawford (1965)
a. SC does not apply exclusionary rule
b. Will not act retroactively
c. Mapp case – Intent of Exclusionary Rule is to deter police misconduct
10) Stovall v. Denno – 3 Prong Test for Retroactivity
a. Purpose served by new standard
b. Extent to police reliance on old standard
c. Effect of new standard to old standard or justice
11) Retroactive Application
a. Appeal Noted
b. Pending – SC releases relevant decision
c. Decision does not always apply retroactively
d. Apply 3 Prong Test
12) Prospective Application – Applied forward
13) U.S. v. Paine (1980) – D lacks Standing in IRS search
14) U.S. v. Hastings (1993) – Cannot reference D’s lack of standing in closing arguments
1) Rule: Evidence obtained illegally is not admissible in court
2) Standing required to challenge illegal Search & Seizure
3) Weeks v. U.S. – Created the Exclusionary Rule
4) Wolf v. Colorado
a. Extended 4th Amendment to states
b. Did not embrace the exclusionary rule
5) Mapp v. Ohio (1961) – Extended the Exclusionary Rule to state proceedings on 4th Amendment issues
6) United States v. Leon – Created “Good Faith” exception to the Exclusionary Rule
7) Conclusion – The progression has been from:
a. The creation of the Exclusionary Rule, to
b. The adoption of the 4th Amendment to the States through the 14th Amendment, to
c. The adoption of the Exclusionary Rule to state action, to carving out the Exclusionary Rule exceptions
1) Introduction: To successfully exclude evidence from trial under a 4th Amendment claim, a D must be found to possess a reasonable expectation of privacy either in the place where the search is conducted or in the item that is seized by law enforcement during the search.
2) Jones v. U.S. (1960)
a. Automatic Standing Rule
b. Based on “legitimately on premises”
c. Rejected by the Rakas decision
3) Simmons v. United States (1968) – Permitted a criminal D to claim a legitimate expectation of privacy argument at a suppression hearing without fear that the claim would be used against him at trial. Addressed dilemma posed in Jones.
4) U.S. v. Salvucci
a. Eliminated Automatic Standing Rule
b. Previously extended under Jones
c. Now recognized under Simmons
5) Rakas v. Illinois (1978)
a. Standard created on D’s reasonable expectation of privacy
b. If the reasonable expectation standard is violated, the evidence is suppressed.
c. If no violation, no suppression
d. Passengers in car found to have no 4th Amendment right to challenge propriety of stop, search and/or seizure.
6) Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980) – Totality of the Circumstances Test decides reasonable expectation of privacy.
7) Minnesota v. Olson (1990)
a. Overnight guest has reasonable expectation of privacy
b. Consistent with Rakas standard
8) Minnesota v. Carter
a. Mere presence in a residence does not necessarily confer a reasonable expectation of privacy
b. Societal needs balance
a. The ability to assert a 4th Amendment right to an illegal search and/or seizure requires that the defendant have a reasonable expectation of privacy based upon the totality of the circumstances.
b. Asserting such right at a suppression hearing cannot be used against the D at trial.
Fruit of the Poison Tree
a. Evidence obtained unlawfully is tainted and therefore inadmissible against the accused at trial.
b. Applies when there is no Probable Cause to arrest.
c. If probable cause exists, Court has admitted evidence, even if tainted.
i. Independently obtained Evidence
ii. Inevitable Discovery
iii. Intervening Act of Free Will
2) Fruit of the Poison Tree Cases
a. Nordone v. U.S. (1939)
i. First use of “Fruit of the Poison Tree” term
ii. Established “attenuation” doctrine – dissipating taint between illicit law enforcement conduct and government’s proof
b. Wong Sun v. U.S. (1963)
i. Illegal Police Entry
ii. SC excluded incriminating statement made during entry
iii. Subsequent confession admitted under “attenuation”
3) Absence of Probable Cause to Arrest
a. Brown v. Illinois (1975)
i. No PC for arrest
ii. Incriminating statements made after Miranda admitted
b. Dunaway v. New York (1979)
i. No PC for arrest
ii. Miranda warnings alone do not attenuate unconst. Arrest
c. Taylor v. Alabama (1982)
i. No PC for arrest
ii. No intervening act to attenuate illegal arrest
4) Presence of Probable Cause to Arrest
NY v. Harris
i. PC to arrest, but occurs improperly, w/o warrant in home
ii. Harris confesses in home
iii. Harris confesses 2nd time at Police Station
iv. SC – 1st confession tainted. 2nd confession permitted because police had justification to question Harris.
5) Exclusionary Rule and the 5th Amendment
Oregon v. Elstad
i. Accused makes incriminating remarks before Miranda warning
ii. Accused makes same remarks after Miranda warning
iii. 2nd set of remarks admissible
6) Exceptions to the Fruit of the Poison Tree
a. Independent Source Exception
i. Segura v. U.S. (1984)
1. Unlawful entry and arrest of D
2. Evidence seized admissible because lawfully executed search warrant
3. Independent source for the warrant
ii. Murray v. United States (1988)
1. Illegal search of warehouse uncovers marijuana
2. Evidence admitted – later acquisition possibility
b. Inevitable Discovery Exception
Nix v. Williams (1984)
i. Preponderance establishes evidence would have inevitably been found
ii. Search for dead body in woods case
c. Intervening Acts of Free Will – See Wong Sun
7) In-Court Identification
United States v. Crew (1980)
a. Victim’s in-court ID of D is permissible
b. Even after Victim shown photos of D after illegal arrest
8) Live Witness Testimony
U.S. v. Ceccolini (1978)
a. Live testimony permissible at trial
b. Even after earlier police misconduct
a. Fruit of Poison Tree prevents tainted evidence from being used in Govt’s case in chief.
b. Exceptions permit admission of evidence
i. Independent Source Exception – Segura, Murray
ii. Inevitable Discovery Exception – Nix v. Williams
iii. Intervening Acts of Free Will – Wong Sun
Impeachment and The Burden of Proof
a. Tainted evidence may possibly be used to impeach the credibility of the D
b. Preponderance of the Evidence BOP
2) Using Tainted Evidence for Impeachment
a. Walder v. United States (1954)
i. D can open the door during direct testimony
ii. Permits prosecution to intro rebuttal evidence impeaching credibility of D on the stand
iii. Variations on Direct/Cross Rebuttal
b. Harris v. New York (1971)
i. Statement made by D to police inadmissible during CIC
ii. But may be admitted during cross if D contradicts direct testimony on the stand
c. United States v. Havens (1980) – Tee Shirt Case
i. Inconsistent testimony by D during Cross may permit impeachment evidence being admitted on rebuttal
ii. D opens door
d. James v. Illinois (1990) – Hair Dresser Case
i. Impeachment is limited to D.
ii. Inconsistent testimony by witness cannot open the door for admission of otherwise inadmissible and inconsistent statement made by D
e. New Jersey v. Portash (1979)
i. Legislative Immunity
ii. Inconsistent evidence cannot be used to open door
f. Michigan v. Harvey
i. 6th Amendment Rights
ii. Can be used to impeach inconsistent direct testimony
3) Allocation of the Burden of Proof
a. Prosecution has BOP when police act w/o warrant
b. D has BOP when police act with warrant
a. Once D takes stand
b. Prosecution may seek to impeach D’s testimony
c. Even if evidence was inadmissible in case in chief
a. Protected & Unprotected interests covered by 4th Amendment
b. Principle: Whether individual’s right to privacy is one that society deems reasonable
c. Depends on Level of Intrusion
a. Katz v. United States (1967) - Telephone booth is a protected interest
b. Cal. v. Greenwood (1988) – Garbage left at curb is not a protected interest
c. Oliver v. United States (1984) – Open fields are not protected interests
d. Hudson v. Palmer (1984) – State prison cells are not protect interests
e. United States v. Place (1983) – Personal luggage is not a protected interest when subjected to a canine sniff by a trained police dog
f. U.S. v. Knotts & U.S. v. Karo (1983) – Beepers do not violate protected interests unless it reveals information unavailable from routine visual surveillance.
g. Andresen v. Maryland (1976) – Business records are not protected interest
h. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily (1978) – Newspaper offices are not per se protected interests
a. Privacy interest must be deemed reasonable by society
b. Sliding scale depending upon reasonableness and degree to which the item is held out to the public.
Professor John Wasowitz
Mid-Term Review Outline by
Christopher S. Lee
1) 4th Amendment ONLY pertains to UNREASONABLE search and seizures
2) 4th Amendment only concerns Governmental action
3) Arrest/Search warrant requires probable cause, and issuance by a neutral and detached magistrate
4) Probable cause at arrest exists if a reasonable person believes a crime has been or will be committed.
5) Totality of the Circumstances Test to determine the sufficiency of a search warrant.
Probable Cause and Automobile Cases
1) Police can stop vehicle that violated a traffic law.
2) Wren v. U.S. (1996) – Ulterior motives permit stop
3) Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1978)
a. After legal stop
b. Police can ask driver and occupants to exit vehicle
4) Ohio v. Robinette (1997) – Police may always ask to search a car
1) Valid Warrant
a. Probable Cause
b. Issued by a Neutral and Detached Magistrate
c. Describe with Particularity the place searched and items seized
2) U.S. v. Leon – Evidence from a warrant w/o probable cause can be admitted if policed relied on facially valid warrant.
3) Magistrate must be neutral and detached
a. Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971) – State Attorney General is not neutral and detached
b. Shandwick v. City of Tampa (1987) – Court Clerk is valid and detached
c. Level of Prominence & Level of Item of Investigation
4) The place to be searched must be described with particularity
a. Maryland v. Garrison (1987) – Evidence seized from wrong apartment admissible when seizure occurred before the police realized error
5) Gaining Entry
a. Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) – No blanket “no knock” policy in drug investigations
b. U.S. v. Rameriz (1998) – “No knock” policy is not influenced by whether property will be broken at the time of the entry
6) Detain/Search People on Premises
a. Ybarra v. Illinois (1979) – Unnamed persons in a search warrant cannot be searched when warrant executed & on premises
b. Michigan v. Summers (1981) – People can be detained during search in drug case search warrants
c. Probable cause to arrest during execution of a warrant permits searches incident to an arrest
Warrantless Arrests and Searches of the Person
1) In connection with arrests
a. Probable Cause is needed
b. Warrantless misdemeanor arrests can be made if crime committed in officer’s presence
c. Warrantless felony arrests are generally permitted if the officer has reason to believe the crime was committed.
d. Home entry generally requires a search warrant
e. Probable cause in a warrantless arrest in a home may defeat suppression motion
a. U.S. v. Watson (1976) – Warrantless arrest in a public place permitted
b. Tennessee v. Garner (1985) – Deadly force raises 4th Amendment seizure issue (not on exam)
c. Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) – “Gerstein Hearing” necessary to determine if there is Probable Cause to hold the arrested person (not on exam)
d. U.S. v. Robinson ( 1973) – A search is lawful pursuant to a valid arrest (based on Probable Cause)
e. Wren v. U.S. (1996)
i. Traffic violation permits Probable Cause to stop
ii. Ulterior Motive of officer permitted
iii. Knowles v. Iowa (1999)
1. If no arrest during traffic violation;
2. Then no search permitted incident to the arrest
f. Schmerber v. California (1966) – Blood sample in DWI is reasonable intrusion.
g. Winston v. Lee (1985)
i. Surgical procedure is not a reasonable intrusion;
ii. Particularly when there is “considerable other evidence”
Geographic Scope of a Warrantless Search
1) 6 Exceptions to the Search Warrant Requirement
a. Search incident to a lawful arrest
b. Automobile Exception
c. Plain View Doctrine
e. Stop & Frisk
f. Exigent Circumstances
2) Chimel v. California (1969) – Wingspan Search Limit
a. SC Limits scope of search
b. Probable Cause exists to conduct search
c. Search must be confined to the person and the area immediately around the person where he could destroy evidence or gain access to a weapon.
3) Maryland v. Buie (1990) – Protective Sweep beyond the wingspan permitted
a. Constitutionally Permitted; but
b. Only to those areas where a person could be standing
4) Arizona v. Hicks (1987) – Plain View Exception
i. Police legitimately on the premises
ii. Evidence of a crime is discovered
iii. Evidence is in plain view
iv. Probable Cause to believe evidence is linked to crime
b. Stereo Equipment case
c. Balance in favor of privacy in the home
5) Vale v. Louisiana (1970) – Substantial Contemporaneous & Immediate Vicinity
a. Consistent with Chimel and Buie
b. Search may be incident to an arrest ONLY if is substantially contemporaneous and within the immediate vicinity of the arrest
6) Segura v. U.S. (19xx) – Gold Star Case
a. Probable cause to search, but lacked warrant
b. Police detained suspects in their home, and then obtained warrant
Warrant for House Arrest
a. Generally don’t need warrant for arrest
b. Arrest DOES require probable cause
i. Misdemeanor – in the presence of the Police
ii. Felony – Probable Cause suspect committed crime
c. Arrest in home requires warrant
2) Payton v. New York (1980) – Shell Casing Case; No warrant
a. Probable cause to arrest Payton
b. But without warrant, evidence seized in home during arrest will be suppressed – 4th Amendment
3) U.S. v. Watson (1976)
a. Police can conduct a warrantless arrest of a person in a public place
b. Arrest necessitates Probable Cause
c. Probable Cause exists when police have reasonable grounds to believe a crime has been committed and suspect may be perpetrator
4) Warden v. Hayden (1967) – Hot Pursuit Exception
5) Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) – Prosecution must prove Exigent Circumstances
6) U.S. v. Santana (1976) – Person standing at Threshold of door is in public and can be arrested without a warrant.
7) Steagald v. U.S. (1981) – Search for suspect named in arrest warrant cannot take place in a 3rd party’s home, unless a separate search warrant is obtained.
a. Police need a warrant before conducting a search
b. Automobile Exception to the search warrant rule
c. Carroll v. U.S. (1925) – Unlike dwelling, car is mobile, therefore police can search vehicle without a search warrant if they have probable cause that the car has ‘fruits’ of the crime.
d. California v. Carney (1985) – Reasonable expectation of privacy is less for car than for home.
2) Plain View exception after legal stop does not require warrant
3) Knowles v. Iowa (1999) – Routine traffic stop without arrest does not permit search.
4) Warrantless search of driver’s wingspan incident to a lawful arrest permitted
5) New York v. Belton (1981) – Leather Jacket Case
a. Lawfully arrested occupants may be searched w/o warrant
b. Passenger Compartment and Containers may be searched
c. Trunk may not be searched
6) Ohio v. Robinette (1997) – Consent Exception
a. Driver’s consent to a search permits warrantless search
b. Police may ask permission to search even after traffic violation issued
7) Colorado v. Bertine (1987) – Impounded Cars
a. Lawfully impounded cars may be searched without warrant
b. Police permitted to conduct full inventory, including closed containers
8) California v. Acevedo (1991) – Probable Cause to search Container
a. Police can conduct search of container ONLY
b. Cannot search other areas of the car
Wren v. U.S. Ulterior Motives permit stoop
Pennsylvania v. Mimms Police can ask occupants to exit vehicle after legal stop
Ohio v. Robinette Police may ALWAYS ask to search a car
U.S. v. Leon Evidence from warrant w/o PC can be admitted on GF
Coolidge v. New Hampshire State Attorney General is NOT neutral and detached
Shandwick v. City of Tampa Court Clerk is valid and detached
Maryland v. Garrison Evidence seized from wrong apt. may be admissible
Richards v. Wisconsin No blanket ‘no knock’ policy in drug investigations
U.S. v. Rameriz Breaking property will not influence ‘no knock’ policy
Ybarra v. Illinois Unnamed persons in search warrant can’t be searched
Michigan v. Summers People can be detained during drug case searches
U.S. v. Watson Warrantless arrest in public place permitted
U.S. v. Robinson Search pursuant to lawful arrest exception
Knowles v. Iowa If no arrest at traffic stop, then no search permitted
Schmerber v. California Blood sample taken for DWI is a reasonable intrusion
Winston v. Lee Surgical procedure is not a reasonable intrusion
Chimel v. California Wingspan Search Limit
Maryland v. Buie Protective sweep beyond wingspan permitted
Arizona v. Hicks Plain View Exception
Vale v. Louisiana Substantially Contemporaneous & Immediate Vicinity
Segura v. U.S. Gold Star Case
Payton v. New York Shell Casing found without warrant – suppresses evidence
U.S. v. Watson Warrantless arrest permitted in public with Probable Cause
Warden v. Hayden Hot Pursuit Exception
Welsh v. Wisconsin Prosecution’s burden to show Exigent Circumstances
U.S. v. Santana Threshold considered public place
Steagald v. U.S. Can’t search for suspect in 3rd party home w/o warrant
Carroll v. U.S. Probable cause permits automobile search
California v. Carney Reasonable expectation of privacy less for car than home
New York v. Belton Leather Jacket Case – may be searched
Ohio v. Robinette Consent Exception
Colorado v. Bertine Impounded Cars
California v. Acevedo Probable Cause to Search Container ONLY
1) Search Incident to an Arrest – U.S. v. Robinson
2) Automobile Exception – California v. Carney
3) Plain View Doctrine – Arizona v. Hicks
4) Consent – Ohio v. Robinette
5) Stop & Frisk – Terry Stop
6) Exigent Circumstances – Schmerber v. California
Professor John Wasowitz
Quiz 2 Review Outline by
Christopher S. Lee
Stop & Frisk
1. Terry v. Ohio (1968)
a. Police can stop a person without probable cause
b. Police must have articulable suspicion of wrongdoing
c. To frisk, police must have reasonable belief person armed and dangerous
2. Sibron v. U.S. (1968) – Unreasonable search, violated 4th Amendment
3. U.S. v. Sharp (1985) – Time limit of stop depends on variety of factors
4. Michigan v. Long (1983) – Terry stop extended to Automobiles
1. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) – Consent must be given voluntarily and intelligently
a. Knowledge of right to refuse
d. Effective Warning to a person of his rights
2. Bumper v. North Carolina (1968) - Grandma lied to by police
a. Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent.
b. Scope of search must match consent given.
3. Florida v. Jimeno (1991) – The subject of a consent search dictates the scope of the search
4. Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990)
a. A reasonable belief can validate entry.
b. If the police believe that the person rendering consent possesses authority to do so, they can conduct a warrantless search even if it later turns out that the person who has consented did not actually have authority to do so.
1. Olmstead v. U.S. (1928)
a. Prohibition-era case
b. Note dissenting opinions by Brandeis and Holmes: Only a matter of time before wiretapping is covered by 4th Amendment
2. Katz v. U.S. (1967) – D phone booth tapped without warrant
a. Reasonable expectation of privacy standard established
b. Definitive case, current standard
3. Berger v. New York (1967)
a. Elements necessary to establish a warrant for a wiretap
b. Same standard as Search Warrant, for most part
i. Probable Cause
ii. Describe conversation with particularity
iii. Neutral and detached magistrate
iv. Name suspects
v. Indicate timeframe (must be short)
vi. Establish plan to terminate wiretap
vii. Provide results to court
4. U.S. v. White (1971)
a. Speaker assumes the risk.
b. If informant is wired, D has no 4th Amendment argument
1. The origination and planning of an offense by an officer of the law and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have committed except for the trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer.
2. Where a person intends to and does commit a crime, the fact that the officer of the law provided an opportunity for and aided or encouraged is not entrapment.
3. Entrapment Defense equivalent to Exclusionary Rule
4. Predisposition – person has inclination to knowingly break the law absent any inducement by law enforcement. The crime or illegal activity need not have been committed before to constitute predisposition (Jacobson)
5. If it can be shown that the person was predisposed to have committed the crime, the entrapment defense will fail regardless of how outrageous the government action was (Russell).
6. To use entrapment as an affirmative defense, the judge must allow jury instructions on the issue. This is not always easy to accomplish.
7. Sorrels v. U.S. (1932) – Focused on the intent or predisposition of D to commit the crime.
8. Jacobson v. U.S. (1992) – Kiddie Porn Case
a. Law enforcement may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent party’s mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the Government may prosecute.
b. Police activity shocked the conscience
c. Prosecution failed, as a matter of law, to adduce evidence to support the jury verdict that Jacobson was predisposed, independent of Gov’t conduct.
9. Sherman v. U.S. (1958) – Law enforcement prohibited from instigating criminal acts by otherwise innocent persons in order to lure them to commit crimes and punish them.
10. U.S. v. Russell (1973) – Methamphetamine Case
a. No entrapment
b. D predisposed to the crime
11. Hampton v. U.S. (1976) – Heroin Distribution
a. Upholds Russell
b. D predisposed to the crime
Stop & Frisk
Terry v. Ohio Police can stop a person w/o PC, need articulable suspicion
Sibron v. U.S. Unreasonable search
U.S. v. Sharp Time limit of stop depends on variety of factors
Michigan v. Long Terry stop extended to Automobiles
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Consent must be given voluntarily and intelligently
Bumper v. North Carolina Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent
Florida v. Jimeno Subject of a consent search dictates the scope of the search
Illinois v. Rodriguez A reasonable belief can validate entry
Olmstead v. U.S. Permitted wiretapping w/o warrant; Note dissents
Katz v. U.S. Reasonable expectation of privacy standard established
Berger v. New York Elements necessary to establish a warrant for a wiretap
a. Probable Cause
b. Describe conversation with particularity
c. Neutral and detached magistrate
d. Name suspects
e. Indicate timeframe (must be short)
f. Establish plan to terminate wiretap
g. Provide results to court
U.S. v. White Speaker assumes the risk
Sorrels v. U.S. Intent or predisposition of D to commit crime
Jacobson v. U.S. Police activity shocked the conscience – Kiddie Porn
Sherman v. U.S. Police prohibited from instigating criminal acts by innocent
U.S. v. Russell Methamphetamine Case – Predisposition to crime
Hampton v. U.S. Heroin Distribution – Predisposition to crime
Professor John Wasowitz
Final Exam Review Outline by
Christopher S. Lee
1. You have the right to remain silent
2. If you give up that right, anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law
3. You have the right to an attorney.
4. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you.
Miranda – General Facts
1. 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination
2. If a statement against self-interest is made to a 3rd party other than the law enforcement officer, it can be admitted regardless whether Miranda rights are administered
3. Privilege against self-incrimination belongs only to the person who would be compelled to incriminate himself by his own testimony.
4. Testimonial Evidence – Contains express or implied assertion of fact that can be either true or false.
a. 5th Amendment only protects against compelled disclosure of testimonial evidence.
b. Physical evidence cannot be true or false – can be compelled
c. Refusal to supply physical evidence may be used against D.
d. Non-testimonial evidence can be compelled for production.
5. Requirements to trigger Miranda Rights
a. Custody – Curtailment of individual’s freedom to leave
b. Interrogation – Any simple or express questioning
6. Assuming there is sufficient additional evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the prosecution will proceed.
7. Inadmissible Miranda statements only apply to Govt’s case in chief.
8. If D makes contradictory statements suppressed under Miranda, D opens the door for Gov’t to use statement in rebuttal.
9. Custody – Objective Test
a. Arrest = Custody
b. Routine traffic stops are not “custodial”.
10. Totality of the Circumstances test used for Miranda waivers made (Fed Std)
11. Questioning cannot begin if accused invokes Miranda rights.
12. Procedural safeguards to protect against self-incrimination.
13. Lawyer’s presence during interrogation also prevents police coercion.
14. Statements obtained in violation of Miranda inadmissible for P case-in-chief; but may be used as impeaching evidence.
15. No type of trickery will vitiate a waiver of Miranda rights.
16. Due Process – 5th and 14th Amendment Due Process Clauses prohibit involuntary confessions generally obtained by
a. Physical Violence
b. Psychological Coercion
17. Voluntariness and Coercion
a. A credible threat of physical violence is generally supports coercion
b. Misrepresentation of facts does not affect voluntariness
c. There usually must be some police misconduct to show coercion
d. Harmless Error Doctrine – Is involuntary admission harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?
e. Involuntary confessions are not admissible for any part of the trial
18. Miranda rights cannot be invoked in anticipation of future interrogations
19. Miranda is not a “Constitutional Straightjacket” – Congress and States may create alternatives so long as they are as effective as Miranda. BUT check against U.S. v. Dickerson case!!!
20. Pre/Post Arrest silence may be impeached
21. Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine generally doesn’t apply to Miranda
22. Subsequent confessions after defective Miranda confession admissible
23. State must prove Miranda waiver by a Preponderance of the Evidence
Miranda – More Facts
1. Miranda “focus” – questioning initiated by law enforcement after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
2. Traffic stops do not mandate Miranda warnings at time of stop for infraction
3. Voluntary detentions are not custodial in nature – no Miranda warning required
1. Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
a. Prophylactic safeguards to protect a suspect’s 5th Amendment right to remain silent from the inherently coercive pressures of custodial interrogation.
b. Right to counsel is not constitutionally guaranteed
c. Procedural safeguard to D’s right to remain silent
d. 6th Amendment right to counsel applies automatically when D formally charged.
e. Right to counsel must be invoked by the suspect
f. Suspect may revoke a waiver at any time
2. Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) – SC – No Interrogation
a. What constitutes interrogation?
b. Shotgun hidden near school
c. Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
d. Majority of CT will lean over backwards to find Innis test not satisfied.
3. Illinois v. Perkins (1990) – Jail Plant does not require Miranda
a. Jail plant; surreptitious interrogation
b. Miranda has no application if that person is an informant who interrogates the D.
c. No coercion from police. No Custodial Interrogation.
d. Miranda is not required to be given in every instance.
e. 6th Amendment right to counsel may attach if adversarial proceedings commence.
4. Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) – Routine Bookings Exception
a. Routine booking questions are an exception to the Miranda Rule
b. Miranda does not apply in the booking process
c. Even if booking is taped and may be used as evidence against D
d. “Zone” where Miranda does not apply.
5. New York v. Quarles (1984) – Public Safety Exception
a. Miranda rights are prophylactic measures, which are not themselves protected by the Constitution, but designed to protect against the right against compulsory self-incrimination.
b. Objective standard
i. Contemporaneous custody and interrogation; AND
ii. Valid concern an innocent party may be injured
6. North Carolina v. Butler (1979) – Knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily
a. Waiver must be made knowingly, intelligentently, voluntarily
b. Conclusive evidence of the absence of a waiver does not occur simply because the accused has refused to sign - written waiver.
c. Express waiver of Miranda rights is not necessary; can be inferred from actions and words of suspect.
7. Connecticut v. Barrett (1987) – Qualified Waiver Exception
a. Qualified Waiver Exceptions
b. Unless statements are qualified, Miranda may be waived
8. Texas v. Cobb (2000) – Right to Counsel is Offense Specific
a. Accused indicted for burglary, questioned about murder
b. SC – Right to counsel is offense specific, and cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions.
c. Burglary and murder are not the same offense; police are not barred by 6th Amendment from interrogation.
U.S. v. Dickerson (2000)
1. Jim Hunley - Guest Speaker
2. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 struck.
3. SC Holding (7-2): Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.
a. Based on Constitutional guarantees
b. SC declines to overrule
5. Supreme Court v. Congress
a. Constitutional Powers concerns; Stare Decisis
i. Embedded in police practices
ii. Part of our national culture
b. SC, not Congress, determines scope of Constitutional guarantees
6. 5th Amendment
a. Applies at custodial holding
b. Knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily waived
c. Or employ other measures as effective
Miranda Wrap Up
1. 6th Amendment right to counsel triggers at adversarial initiation.
2. 6th Amendment prohibits police from deliberately eliciting evidence – based on a reasonable person standard
3. Suspect must be told if counsel wants to see him under 6th Amendment
4. DNA Testing – 4th Circuit District Court holds testing is a part of Due Process under the 5th Amendment
1. Trilogy of Cases
a. Edwards v. Arizona (1981) – Right to remain silent
b. Roberson v. Arizona (1988) – 5th Amendment Right to Counsel
c. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) – 6th Amendment Right to Counsel
2. Edwards v. Arizona (1981) – Bright Line Rule – Right to Remain Silent
a. Bright line rule – Once the suspect has asserted a desire to have counsel, they may never question him again prior to supplying him with that counsel.
b. Once right to counsel invoked, police must cease questioning
c. If suspect initiates further discussions, statements may be admissible.
3. Arizona v. Roberson (1988) – Prevents interrogations about another case
a. Bright line rule applies even when questioned about different crime
b. Edwards case prevents interrogation about another case
c. 5th Amendment Right to Counsel is NOT offense specific.
d. 6th Amendment Right to Counsel IS offense Specific
4. Michigan v. Mosely (1975) – Miranda and subsequent confession admitted
a. D Mirandized at 1st interrogation then confessed at 2nd interrogation.
b. SC – No violation by resuming questioning, and not renewing Miranda.
c. 2nd Mirandized confession following 1st non-Mirandized confession is admissible
5. Davis v. U.S. – Unambiguous assertion of Miranda right required
a. D’s assertion of 5th Amendment right to counsel must be unambiguous to be upheld by the courts.
b. See O’Connor’s summary – p. 563
6. Minnick v. Mississippi – Questioning must cease upon request for counsel
a. Statements to FBI struck
b. Statements to Deputy Sheriff Denham permitted
c. 5th Amendment challenge
d. SC – Statement inadmissible at trial (7-2, Rehnquist, Scalia dissenting)
e. Edwards rule extended in this case
f. Questioning must cease upon request for counsel
7. Moran v. Burbine – Sister hires attorney; Right to counsel personal
a. Sister hires attorney for D
b. D does not know about counsel
c. D waives Miranda rights and confesses
d. 6th Amendment – Fails, no adversarial process
e. 5th Amendment – Fails, No obligation to inform D of family’s acts
f. Constitution does not require police to notify D of flow of information.
g. Due process clause will become more important in police conduct.
8. McNeil v. Wisconsin - 6th Amendment is offense specific
a. Subsequent offense-specific interrogations may be invalid
b. Police may seek waiver regarding crimes other than D is charged with
9. Texas v. Cobb - SC – 6th Amendment is crime specific/instance specific
a. 6th Amendment right to Counsel
b. Arrested on burglary
c. Voluntarily offered incriminating statements for murder
d. Volunteered statements are not barred by the 5th Amendment.
10. Michigan v. Jackson (1986)
a. 6th Amendment right to counsel
b. Once formal charges lodged, 6th Amendment right to counsel attaches
11. State v. McKnight (1968) – Miranda waiver no less voluntary, knowing or intelligent because of misconceptions
12. Duckworth v. Egan (1989) - Adequacy of warning
a. The substance of Miranda is all that is needed
b. Police do not have to be precise in their articulation of Miranda
c. Miranda does not need to be repeated verbatim
13. Colorado v. Spring (1987) – An effective Miranda waiver does not require suspect be informed about subject of inquiry prior to questioning.
14. Stansbury v. California (1994) – Person may be in “custody” but not suspect
15. Beckwith v. U.S. (1976) – Focus defined in Miranda
a. Questioning initiated by police after custody; or
b. Otherwise deprived of freedom of action
c. The longer the period, the likelier accused in custody
Miranda Rights Distinguished
1. If accused asserts 5th Amendment right to remain silent
a. All questions must cease in connection with that crime.
b. But police can reinitiate questioning after a reasonable time.
c. And accused can be questioned regarding other offenses
2. Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) – Initiating stmts can waive Miranda
a. D asserts 5th Amendment right to counsel
b. Then initiates conversation
c. Then Miranda warnings repeated and confession given
d. Miranda rights waived
3. Moran v. Burbine (1986) – Sister hires lawyer
a. 5th Amendment right to counsel not violated if police do not tell accused that attorney hired by relative has tried to contact him.
b. 6th Amendment right to counsel is not violated here because adversarial proceedings have not commenced.
c. 5th Amendment cannot be used to punish perceived police misconduct.
4. 6th Amendment Right to Counsel
a. Successful challenge possible when D questioned w/o appointed counsel.
b. 6th Amendment right attaches if:
i. Questioning done by paid informant;
ii. Adversarial proceedings commenced; and
iii. Attorney appointed.
5. McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) – 6th Amendment is offense specific
a. D assertion of 6th Amendment right will not suppress statements made by D to police about charges unrelated to those, which he has appt. counsel.
b. Scalia distinguishes Miranda-Edwards-Roberson – p. 566
6. Texas v. Cobb – 6th Amendment case – Offense Specific
a. D had counsel for one crime
b. Advised of Miranda rights, then voluntarily confessed to another crime which he had not been charged with
c. No application where crimes are factually related to charged offenses.
7. Brewer v. Williams (1977) – “Christian Burial” Speech
a. Interrogation under 5th and 6th Amendments are not necessarily interchangeable
b. State failed to show D effectively failed to waive right to counsel.
c. P must show D understood right to remain silent, and intended to relinquish right.
Rhode Island v. Innis Shotgun near school
Illinois v. Perkins Jail plant – Miranda not required in all instances
Pennsylvania v. Muniz Miranda doesn’t apply in booking process – “Zone”
New York v. Quarles Public safety exception
North Carolina v. Butler Waiver must be made knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily
Connecticut v. Barrett Qualified statements permit Miranda protection
U.S. v. Dickerson Guest speaker case
Davis v. U.S. Unambiguous assertion of Miranda right required
Berkemer v. McCarthy Traffic stops do not always mandate Miranda warnings
Oregon v. Mathiason Voluntary detentions do not require Miranda warnings
Fare v. Michael C. Probation officer not attorney. Totality of Circumstances
State v. McKnight Miranda waiver still applies if accused makes mistake
Duckworth v. Egan Miranda does not require verbatim recitation
Colorado v. Spring Subject of inquiry not required for Miranda waiver
Stansbury v. California Person may be in custody, but not a suspect
Beckwith v. U.S. Focus is questioning initiated by police after custody
5th Amendment Right to Remain Silent
Edwards v. Arizona 5th Amendment right to remain silent
Minnick v. Mississippi Statements to deputy inadmissible, extends Edwards rule
5th Amendment Right to Counsel
Roberson v. Arizona 5th Amendment right to counsel
Moran v. Burbine Sister hires attorney. No police obligation to inform D
Oregon v. Bradshaw Mirandized and confesses – rights waived
Davis v. U.S. D request to counsel must be unambiguous
Minnick v. Mississippi Right to counsel violation
Brewer v. Williams Christian Burial Speech
6th Amendment Right to Counsel
Texas v. Cobb Right to counsel offense-specific
Moran v. Burbine Sister hires attorney. No adversarial process
McNeil v. Wisconsin Offense specific
© CHRISTOPHER S. LEE 2001